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CONTRACTS, BILLS AND NOTES, AND SALES
C. THOMAS WYCHE*
Since the 1957 Survey includes bills and notes, and sales
in addition to contracts, we will endeavor to discuss the cases
in their most appropriate branches of law.
I. CONTRACTS
Contracts to Convey Realty
The Supreme Court in Aust v. Beard1 denied specific per-
formance to an alleged parol executory contract for the sale
of real estate upon the ground that no valid contract had
been entered into between the parties and on the further
ground that there had not been sufficient part performance
to remove the contract from the operation of the Statute of
Frauds. Justice Oxner, in a highly informative opinion, traced
the requirements of the "standard of proof" of a contract2
and held that in the instant factual situation the parties only
"intended" in the future to contract, and the case was re-
versed and remanded for dismissal.3 The original seller de-
faulted in the action and the Court, bound by the concurrent
findings of the Master and Circuit Judge, treated the subse-
quent purchaser as if he occupied a position no stronger than
the seller, since the findings had been that he bought the
real estate with actual knowledge that another was claiming
possession under the alleged parol contract.
Thomas v. Jeffcoat 4 is of interest to the Bar in general and
of particular interest to lawyers with a real estate clientele.
After the purchaser refused to go through with the sale, the
seller brought suit against the purchaser and broker seeking
*Member of firm of Wyche, Burgess & Wyche of Greenville, South
Carolina. B.E., 1946, Yale University; LL.B., 1949, University of
Virginia; Member of Greenville County, South Carolina, and American
Bar Associations.
1. 230 S. C. 515, 96 S. E. 2d 558 (1957).
2. See 96 S. E. 2d 561-562 wherein the case law relating to the stand-
ard of proof is reviewed.
3. The decision appears eminently sound. The plaintiff's testimony
was "I intended to buy them this spring," and the allegation of the
complaint was that the purchase price was $6,000 or $6,500. Further-
more, there is no justification for ordering specific performance at
$8,500, the amount the subsequent purchaser paid. See 96 S. E. 2d 562.
4. 230 S. C. 126, 94 S. E. 2d 240 (1956).
1
Wyche: Contracts, Bills and Notes, and Sales
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SuRVEY OF SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
to recover the earnest money that had been deposited by the
purchaser with the broker. The seller introduced the contract
of sale into evidence and rested his case. The purchaser sought
to show that the lot was not as represented and sought a
directed verdict in his favor. The broker, relying upon proof
of the local custom, sought a directed verdict in his favor for
one-half of the earnest money in case the contract were held
valid. The Supreme Court, in affirming the trial court's
directed verdict for the plaintiff, held the construction of the
contract a matter of law for the court since the language re-
lating to the earnest money was clear and unambiguous.6
Chief Justice Stukes, writing a concurring opinion, pointed
out that regardless of the custom, the broker would not be
entitled to the earnest money unless specifically provided
for in the contract. The Chief Justice also pointed out that
to permit recovery by the broker in this situation would allow
him to benefit from his wrong, since there had been an inno-
cent misrepresentation regarding the property by the broker's
employee to the purchaser. 6
Dean v. Dean7 held invalid an alleged contract between a
mother and four of her children wherein one of the children
had not executed the contract. The parties had inherited an
interest in realty and under the terms of the alleged contract
the children assigned the income to the mother for life in
consideration of her agreeing to devise her interest to the
four children. Thereafter, the mother died, devising the prop-
erty to certain grandchildren, and the three children who
had signed the contract sought enforcement. In determining
that the alleged contract could not be enforced because it was
not fully executed by all of the parties, the Court reasoned
that the obligation imposed was joint, not several, and that it
was, therefore, necessary for all parties to sign the contract
in order to make it effective.
Fourth Circuit Construes Public Contract Regarding
Payment of Use Tax
Judge Sobeloff, in McJunkin Corporation v. City of Orange-
5. The contract provision is as follows:
The purchaser hereby agrees and fully understands that the
earnest money deposit will be retained by the Seller in the event
that the purchaser fails to settle within 60 days period provided
herein making the total purchase price $4,500.00. * * * 230 S. C. 129,
94 S. E. 2d 241.
6. Query the result if the broker had a written contract?
7. 229 S. C. 430, 93 S. E. 2d 206 (1956).
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burg,8 held the bidder, and not the City, liable for the South
Carolina use or sales tax resulting from a municipal improve-
ment. The original specifications, drawn up when it was in-
tended that the contractor would do a complete installation,
contained language which made it evident that the bidder was
to pay the tax.9 The language of the addendum was not as
clear, and the addendum sought several alternative proposals,
instead of the "package deal."'1 The Court stated that the
"change in scope of the contract awarded does not expunge
any items or conditions of the original specifications not in
conflict with the Addendum,"" and quickly reverted to the
original specifications to clear up any ambiguity existing in
the language of the addendum. Treating the case as one not
requiring oral testimony to clear up any ambiguity, the Court,
nevertheless, pointed out that the City had informed the bid-
der that the bid price should include the tax.
Termination of Agency Contract
The only other contract case before the Fourth Circuit
was A. A. Brooks v. Jack's Cookie Company,' which was on
appeal for the second time. In the first appeal,13 the Court
held that the case should have been submitted to the jury on
the issue of breach of contract. Citing Williston,14 the Court
held the manufacturer was not at liberty to terminate the
agreement at will, even though the agreement contained no
provision for its termination, but the manufacturer must re-
tain the agent in its employment for a reasonable period of
time. The second appeal involved only the question of whether
the trial judge had charged the jury correctly, which the
Appellate Court held had been done, although the exact lan-
guage of the prior holding was not used by the District Court.
Allegation of Payment to Unauthorized Person May Be
Stricken As Irrelevant
The plaintiff, an assignee, sued in Olympic Radio and Tele-
vision, Inc. v. Baker,'" for the balance owing by the defendant
8. 238 F. 2d 528 (4th Cir. 1956).
9. See 238 F. 2d 530 for quotation of the original specifications.
10. See 238 F. 2d 530 for the language of the addendum.
11. 238 F. 2d 531.
12. 238 F. 2d 69 (4th Cir. 1956).
13. Jack's Cookie Company v. A. A. Brooks, 227 F. 2d 935 (4th Cir.
1955).
14. WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, § 1027 (a) p. 2852.
15. 230 S. C. 383, 95 S. E. 2d 636 (1956).
[Vol. 10
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for the purchase of three television sets. The defendant in
his answer sought to allege payment to an agent and servant
of the plaintiff's assignor. The plaintiff's motion to strike
this allegation was denied by the lower court but the Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the allegation was irrelevant
since there was no allegation that the claim payment was
made to the assignee of the obligation or to one expressly
or impliedly authorized to receive it on behalf of the as-
signee.
Breach of Warranty
Two cases, Spartanburg Hotel Corporation v. Smith,'6 and
Cannon v. Pulliam Motor Company,17 involved contract ques-
tions, but they will be discussed under Sales.
II. SALES
Breach of Express or Implied Warranty
The plaintiff in Odom v. Ford Motor Company'8 sought to
recover damages for an alleged breach of warranty of sound-
ness and fitness of a tractor. The tractor was manufactured
by the defendant, sold to its Charlotte distributor, who, in
turn, sold it to a local dealer from whom it was purchased
by the plaintiff. The complaint alleged an oral express war-
ranty as to quality and adaptability claimed to have been
made by the local dealer, and also an implied warranty by the
manufacturer as to the fitness and adaptability of the tractor
for agriculture purposes. At the commencement of the trial,
the defendant moved to require the plaintiff to elect whether
to proceed under the express warranty or implied warranty.
Judge Pruitt reserved his ruling, and after the testimony
showed that the local dealer was not an agent of the defendant
and that he did not have any authority to bind the defendant
by any representation or warranty, the plaintiff elected to
proceed solely on an implied warranty theory. The jury re-
turned a verdict for the plaintiff and although numerous ex-
ceptions were made, our Supreme Court considered only the
defendant's contention that the action could not be maintained
against it on an implied warranty because of lack of privity
of contract. Justice Oxner cited the general rule that the war-
ranty of a chattel does not run with the property but that it
16. 231 S. C. 1, 97 S. E. 2d 199 (1957).
17. 230 S. C. 131, 94 S. E. 2d 397 (1956).
18. 230 S. C. 320, 95 S. E. 2d 601 (1956).
1957]
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is personal to the purchaser to whom the warranty is made19
and noted the various exceptions that have arisen wherein
the third party or ultimate consumer is allowed to maintain
an action against the manufacturer despite the absence of
privity of contract.20 The Court's reasoning is that the ex-
ceptions which have arisen are exceptions based on negli-
gence or tort actions, whereas, in the case at Bar it was
a contractual obligation and that absence of privity barred
recovery.
The Court pointed out that recovery may be allowed on the
theory of express warranty without a showing of privity
"where the purchaser of an article relied on representations
made by the manufacturer in advertising material".2 1 This
language, when considered with the lengthy quote from the
Georgia case of Studebaker Corporation v. Nai2 2 cited in
Spartanburg Hotel Corporation v. Smith, 23 could indicate a
broadening of the application of this theory. The Georgia
case indicated that consideration was present between the
manufacturer and the purchaser and that the intermediate
distributors and dealers were "merely a means of distribution
to the ultimate purchaser". The Spartanburg Hotel case was
an action for breach of express oral warranty made by the
manufacturer's agent, and the Court brushed aside the fact
that the sale had been billed in the name of a local dealer.
The Court held that there was sufficient evidence for the jury
to conclude that the sale had been made by the manufacturer
and the purchaser and that the local billing was part and
parcel of the contract. The Court reemphasized the fact that
even if the local dealer were an independent contractor, that it
becomes of no importance when the warranty was made
directly to the purchaser. Another feature of the case was
the Court's treatment of the defense of accord and satisfac-
tion. After a review of the history of the defense of accord
and satisfaction, the Court held that the mere cashing of two
of the manufacturer's checks by the purchaser did not as a
matter of law give rise to the defense of accord and satisfac-
19. The Court cited for this proposition the leading case of Mauldin
v. Milford, 127 S. C. 503, 121 S. E. 547 (1922).
20. The Court cited Justice Cardoza's celebrated decision of MacPher-
son v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 which greatly
expanded the scope of the exceptions which had existed since common
law.
21. 230 S. C. 328, 95 S. E. 2d 605 (1956).
22. 82 Ga. App. 779, 62 S. E. 2d 198 (1950).
23. 231 S. C. 1, 97 S. E. 2d 199 (1957).
[Vol. 10
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tion. The case was reversed on the question of damages,
which point will be discussed under the survey article on that
subject.
Cannon v. Pulliam Motor Co.24 involved the construction of
the Ford Motor Company warranty.25 In the trial court the
plaintiff obtained a verdict after the court concluded that
the warranty was ambiguous leaving its construction to the
jury. The Supreme Court held that the language was not am-
biguous and that it was error for the trial court to allow
interpretation to be placed on the words by the jury. An
excellent discussion and case analysis is contained in the opin-
ion dealing with the question of how much opportunity must
be given to the contractor to remedy defects which exist.
The Fourth Circuit in Ralston Purina Co. v. Edmunds,
26
held that the plaintiff failed to introduce sufficient evidence
to get the case to the jury. The plaintiff alleged that Purina
made certain changes in the size of its turkey feed pellets
(from 2/16th inch to 5/32nds inch) and that the new pellets
were different in color and harder in texture (which Purina
denied). The reason given for the directed verdict was the cau-
sal relationship between the subsequent loss of productivity to
the change in the pellets was not shown, the pellet change
being a mere possibility rather than a probable cause.
Long Manufacturing Co. v. Manning Tractor Co.,27 a suit
for balance due on certain equipment, involved a defense
by Manning alleging that Long's goods were defective and
that Long (a manufacturer) had failed to comply with its
warranty to service and furnish proper parts. The point ac-
tually decided on appeal was whether some five purchasers
might join the suit as parties to the action so that they might
assert claims against Long. The Supreme Court affirmed
Judge Eatmon's Order denying them permission to enter the
suit.
Sumter Electric Rewinding Co. v. Aiken County S. C. Clays,
Inc.28 presented a factual situation wherein the alleged pur-
chaser could not inspect the equipment because of its loca-
tion but relied upon the seller's representations and executed
24. 230 S. C. 131, 94 S. E. 2d 397 (1956).
25. The warranty and contract provision appear at 230 S. C. 135,
94 S. E. 2d 399.
26. 241 F. 2d 164 (4th Cir. 1957).
27. 229 S. C. 301, 92 S. E. 2d 700 (1956).
28. 230 S. C. 229, 95 S. E. 2d 259 (1956).
1957]
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the purchase note. The trial court reversed the Master (to
whom it had been referred by consent), holding that the sale
was contingent on the opportunity to inspect and this was
affirmed by the Supreme Court.
III. BILLS AND NOTES
Two interesting cases hinged on the question of determining
whether the parties were holders in due course without notice.
Justice Taylor in a concise opinion in Johnston v. The Farm-
ers and Merchants Bank20 held that a payee of a note is not
a holder in due course without notice and that it was error for
the trial court to disallow evidence attempting to show par-
tial failure of consideration. In Carolina Housing & Mortgage
Corporation v. Reynolds, 0 the maker of the note was sued by
the purchaser for the value of the note. The note was given
to the contractor for repairs on the maker's home, and the
contractor thereafter negotiated it to the plaintiff. The plain-
tiff had inspected the house and the maker sought to defend
on the failure of consideration. The Court in determining
that the purchaser was a holder in due course reasoned that
the purchaser did not have "actual knowledge" of the defect
and that it was under no obligation to have made the inspec-
tion initially and that it would not be liable if the inspection
had not been properly made.
Carolina Housing & Mortgage Corporation v. Orange Hill
A.M.E. Church3' was in essence a procedural question since
the issue was whether the original payee of a note should be
joined as a party defendant after the maker placed at issue
the validity of the note. In affirming the trial court's de-
cision that the payee is a proper party, Justice Moss traces
the obligation of the payee, even if his assignment is without
recourse.
Accommodation Party - Right to Have Mortgage
Cancelled
Clanton v. Ca1,nton32 was an action initiated by a wife seek-
ing a divorce from her husband and related relief consisting
of the cancellation of a certain mortgage executed by the
wife and her husband. The note which accompanied the mort-
29. 229 S. C. 603, 93 S. E. 2d 916 (1956).
30. 230 S. C. 491, 96 S. E. 2d 485 (1957).
31. 230 S. C. 498, 97 S. E. 2d 28 (1957).
32. 229 S. C. 356, 92 S. E. 2d 878 (1956).
[Vol. 10
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gage had been signed by the husband and endorsed by the
wife. The note was payable to the bank and the proceeds were
placed in a separate bank account designated as a reserve
account and controlled by the bank as security against losses it
might incur through the handling of a large volume of the
husband's checks. The wife simultaneously executed a war-
ranty agreement to the bank which provided that her guar-
anty was not to be affected by any other security that the
bank might have from the husband, that the bank might
require her to pay any loan made to the husband without
first exhausting its security, and that it should cover future
advances. Thereafter, the husband drew a check on the ac-
count in the amount of the note and mortgage payable to the
bank who, thereafter, assigned the note and mortgage to one
of the husband's corporate enterprises. After reaching an
initial conclusion that the wife was an accommodation party33
since she received no value for endorsing the note, the Court
held that there was not a valid assignment by the bank to
the husband's corporation. The Court further held that since
the purpose for which the note and mortgage had been given
had been fulfilled that the wife was therefore entitled to
have the mortgage satisfied. The basis of the Court's reason-
ing was that the assignment was not for valuable considera-
tion and that it was taken subject to all of the equities and
defenses existing in favor of the wife since the corporation
was not a bona fide holder of the note and mortgage.
Justice Taylor in Shocket v. Fickling34 reemphasized the
ancient rule that when valid or valuable consideration for a
note exists, its adequacy or sufficiency is ordinarily imma-
terial even if the property subsequently becomes of little
value.
33. As defined in CODE OF LAws OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 8-846.
34. 229 S. C. 412, 93 S. E. 2d 203 (1956).
1957]
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